Lebanese Politics is characterized by the social and political hegemony of its sectarian elites. Though undemocratic, this hegemony is somehow required for the stability of a consociational system such as Lebanon. Since the elite structures within the communities in Lebanon are pluralistic, sectarian elites have to constantly struggle with their rivals within their respective sect. Therefore, elites strategically use political rents or sectarian symbols to ensure they have enough supporters within their community and be its undisputed and strong leader.
Saad Hariri, the son of the killed former Prime Minister and Sunni ‘martyr’ Rafik Hariri, has often been criticized for his political moves and considered to be a weak leader, e.g. towards the Hezbollah-led March 8 coalition during the clashes in May 2008 or on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon investigating on his father’s death. The latest political crisis in Lebanon, the fall of Hariris government on January 12th, 2011 and the appointment of Najib Mikati as designated Prime Minister, was somehow a defeat for Hariri. However, by constantly upholding the ‘martyrdom’ of his father’s death, he still manages to secure his power within the community, esp. since the appointment of Mikati with March 8 support was interpreted as an attack on the community and ‘martyr’ Rafik Hariri.
Interviews with young supporters of Saad Hariri working for the youth section of his Future Movement showed that the ‘martyrdom’ is still an important pillar of his power. They also showed, that the Sunni community is in a precarious situation seeing itself as being threatened mostly by the Shia community and Hezbollah. The violent reactions of Sunnis on the streets of Beirut and Tripoli after the appointment of Mikati showed that Hariri does not have full control of his community. Violent clashes between angry Sunnis and Shia could easily erupt and lead to clashes similar to those in 2008 or worse. The role of political elites, such as Saad Hariri, is crucial in this situation. If the disparity between the masses and the elites grow, the possibility for uncontrolled streets violence increases and, therefore, the possibility for civil war-like scenarios in Lebanon.