Q: Mr. Al-Jawahiri, can you share with us some background information on the Iraqi Al-Amal Association?
A: Iraqi Al-Amal Association was established in 1992 by a group of Iraqi citizens in response to the dire situation in Iraq following the First Gulf War, and the American attacks on the country following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The purpose of establishing the Association was to work on reducing the suffering of Iraqis. The first president of Iraqi Al-Amal Association was the Iraqi poet Saad Youssef, and amongst the key founders was prominent feminist Hanaa Edwar.
During this early period, the association sought and gained financial support from Iraqis and activists outside Iraq, and was able to bring to Iraqi Kurdistan a Lebanese-Belgian medical team. Subsequently, we were able to open three health centers and training centers for youth.
In 1995 Iraqi Al-Amal Association held its first congress in Holland. The majority of participants were expatriate Iraqis as well as four Iraqis living in Iraq. The Association began to strengthen its relations with Arab and non-Arab organizations outside Iraq. Through these relations it began to improve its internal and external performance. The founding group also included Lebanese and Palestinian activists. From 1995 until 2003 our activities focused on training and orientation for women and young people. Activities took place in Iraqi Kurdistan. I should note that during that period only few Iraqis traveled from Iraq to Kurdistan. During this period we also worked on strengthening our relations with international organizations and the United Nations. Our programs addressed capacity building, and reducing people’s suffering.
Q: What happened after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime?
A: In September 2002 the Board of the Iraqi Al-Amal Association held a meeting in which it decided that in the event of war, and with it the possible removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the Association should be present in Baghdad. Preparations for the relocation of our office to Baghdad began in February 2003. Logistically, we were ready, equipped with satellite and mobile phones. I was working from Syria at the time and Hanaa Edwar, our Secretary, was based in Erbil.
We entered Baghdad and opened our office in May 2003, forty days after the beginning of war. We still are in the same office today. We were able to open and equip our office through financial support from Secours Populaire Francais . We evaluated the health and financial needs of local communities in weak and underdeveloped areas. This was a good starting point for us.
In the beginning, humanitarian organizations were all foreign except for the Iraqi Al-Amal Association and REACH, a Kurdish organization. There were foreign organizations with Iraqi staff, such as Islamic Relief, World Relief and others. There were foreign organizations from many countries operating in all regions of Iraq, and thus the NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) was formed out of the necessity to coordinate efforts and distribute aid. NCCI also coordinated with the Iraqi government through regular meetings with its officials.
Q: What was the legal context for the work of these organizations? Was the old law abolished?
A: There was no legal framework. It was very chaotic. Nothing remained after the war. Everyone cooperated with everyone and this was the new reality. More international organizations began to come in, and Iraqi organizations began to assemble in the ‘Congress’ Palace, which was under the control of the U.S. armed forces.
U.S. armed forces began to register, follow-up with and coordinate the activities of Iraqi and foreign NGOs. In October 2003, decree no. 45 was issued by the then US Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, organizing the registration and work of NGOs in Iraq and abolishing previous laws. This decree reflected a view which is based on September 11 in which NGO work in Iraq was considered to be linked to terrorism. This approach was a bad start for the new state as there was a misunderstanding as to the role and functioning of NGOs. The prevailing idea in the Iraqi government and the Iraqi people was that the role of NGOs is limited to providing aid in the areas of construction, health, and other financial support (e.g. salaries) but that it does not influence decision making in development. This view became entrenched in Iraqis’ minds and was supported through the observation of religious groups who also took on the role of providing aid. The U.S. army was also handing out aid as well as political parties, without proper coordination.
Q: How would you describe the Iraqi civil society during that period?
A: The problem was twofold: the politicization of civil society’s work on the one hand, and on the other hand the inability of civil society to fully live up to its intended role. The U.S. army wanted to work with the Iraqi civil society and viewed it, in the beginning, the same way it viewed the Iraqi people. The U.S. army asked people to form organizations and gave them projects such as holding meetings, distributing aid, building schools, etc. This trend was problematic for civil society because a lot of money was spent on constructing schools, infirmaries, etc., but without monitoring spending or evaluating project implementation. Some Iraqi groups were given over $100,000 to organize 2-day conferences in Baghdad – these are horrifying numbers.
Further, U.S. organizations worked to build the capacities of Iraqi organizations but not in the correct way. For example, one or two-day trainings for 40 people on management and proposal writing, and follow-up Training-of-Trainers (ToT) were organized. The result was a number of trainers on management with only three to four days of training and with no experience whatsoever. These trainers began to train other Iraqis and so a large section of civil society was built on wrong foundations because it did not benefit from experience and proper training.
A main problem is that many international organizations did not concentrate on strengthening the management of Iraqi organizations but rather focused on immediately implementing projects. In reality, foreign organizations used an Iraqi cadre within Iraqi organizations as a way to implement projects but without involving this cadre in decision-making or in needs assessments, and definitely not in planning processes.
Many foreign organizations worked in aid, and did not have a background in development or human rights work. Thus they did not provide real opportunities to help develop Iraqi civil society.
Q: Can we say that many organizations were created simply because funding was available to create them, and not because there was an actual need or idea?
A: This was true in terms of the corruption in some organizations. This doesn’t mean that there are no NGOs with good intentions who are genuinely concerned with rebuilding Iraq. The government is however considered to be the sole distributor of services and there is no space given for civil society to play its role.
Moreover, the presence of U.S. soldiers in civil society helped create an atmosphere of corruption. The U.S. army didn’t care about the quality of service/projects and was concerned only with its image. So schools would be built, but with the first drop of rain, the painting would be ruined. This is corruption, especially since this was occurring throughout the country.
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