The Solidarity Directory دليل تضامن

HEINRICH BÖLL STIFTUNG BEIRUT Middle East

POLICY PAPER / OCTOBER 2026

Who is responsible when communities are displaced?

Displacement, resource scarcity and public accountability in Lebanon

A political economy framework for social solidarity amid protracted displacement



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THE SOLIDARITY DIRECTORY / DALEEL TADAMON


DISPLACEMENT AT A GLANCE / DATA USED IN THIS PAPER

Beyond the shelter-centred view of displacement

As of 12 August 2026, most internally displaced people were living outside collective shelters. Public responses must account for the places where they actually live.

351,558

Internally displaced people in Lebanon



93.6%

329,208

Living outside collective sites

6.4%

22,350

Across 229 collective sites

The IOM also recorded 863,172 people who had begun returning. There is no reliable national breakdown of the housing arrangements of displaced people outside collective shelters. This paper therefore avoids invented estimates.

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The issue is not simply rising need. The geography of need has changed.

SECTION / 01

Executive summary

The nature of Lebanon's displacement crisis is changing.

Lebanon is no longer dealing solely with a humanitarian emergency concentrated in collective shelters. Displacement is increasingly becoming a protracted reality across towns and cities, housing markets, local economies, public services and municipalities.

As of 12 August 2026, the International Organization for Migration's Displacement Tracking Matrix recorded 351,558 internally displaced people in Lebanon. Of these, 22,350 were staying at 229 collective sites, while 329,208 lived outside them.

Only around 6.4% of displaced people were in collective shelters, compared with 93.6% living elsewhere. The IOM also recorded 863,172 people who had begun returning. Continued insecurity, destruction and gaps in services, however, make some returns fragile and potentially reversible.

Current displacement status	Best available estimate
Total internally displaced	351,558
In shelters and collective sites	22,350 / 6.4%
Outside collective sites	329,208 / 93.6%
Renting, in private housing or with host families	No reliable national count
In tents, unfinished buildings or other temporary arrangements	No reliable national count

This distinction matters.

Available assessments indicate that large numbers of displaced people outside collective sites rent accommodation or stay with relatives and host families. Others live in informal or temporary arrangements. Published national data, however, do not provide reliable figures for each category.

Assigning precise numbers to these groups would create a false sense of accuracy.

If public policy sees only those living in collective shelters, it effectively overlooks more than 93% of displaced people.

The problem runs deeper than missing data.

Lebanon faces a widening gap between a rapidly changing social geography and institutions, resources and accountability mechanisms that have not adapted at the same pace.

War should not be treated as a temporary interruption after which society automatically returns to its previous arrangements.

The war did not cause Lebanon's financial collapse, weakened public institutions or dependence on informal service networks. It interacted with these existing trends and accelerated them.

Displacement then added a major spatial shift.

People moved. Income sources disappeared. Demand shifted from one municipality to another. Children changed where they lived and studied. Workers entered new labour markets. Housing demand rose in different areas. Public services designed around an earlier population distribution now had to serve a different one.

The issue, then, is not simply that needs have grown.

The geography of need itself has changed.

This paper asks: What happens when population distribution, economic pressure and social relations change faster than the institutions responsible for responding to them?

The central argument is not that displacement automatically produces social fragmentation.

Rather, protracted displacement can intensify existing pressures over the distribution of resources. When institutions fail to track these changes, adjust resources transparently or assign responsibilities clearly, material grievances can turn into collective blame, political clientelism and sectarian competition.

The pathway examined in this paper is:

Pre-existing institutional weakness and war damage → displacement and population redistribution → pressure on housing, jobs and services → inadequate or opaque institutional response → grievances and perceived injustice → political mediation and identity-based framing → risk of social fragmentation.

HOW THE PATHWAY WORKS

How material pressure can become social division

01	Pre-existing institutional weakness and war damage
02	Displacement and population redistribution
03	Pressure on housing, work and services
04	Inadequate or opaque institutional response
05	Grievances and perceptions of injustice
06	Political brokerage and identity-based framing
07	Risk of social fragmentation

This pathway is conditional, not inevitable. Clear, early institutional action can interrupt it.

Public policy should therefore look beyond displaced households alone.

Its central unit of analysis should be the affected locality: the place where displaced people, long-term residents, refugees, businesses, municipalities and public services must navigate increasingly scarce resources together.

Lebanon is not starting from scratch.

The Ministry of Social Affairs' 2026 Economic Inclusion Strategy sets out elements of an emerging institutional system, including beneficiary registration and profiling, economic inclusion pathways, monitoring and evaluation, complaints mechanisms, and cooperation with municipalities, civil society and the Ministry of Labour.

These are substantive commitments.

They also provide benchmarks against which government performance can be assessed.

An economic inclusion strategy alone cannot resolve the problem addressed here. A programme focused on individual beneficiaries may improve their circumstances while an entire municipality continues to face rising rents, crowded schools, water shortages, unemployment, declining service capacity and tensions between groups.

Lebanon therefore needs to connect systems focused on individuals with a system that measures pressure across affected localities and assigns public responsibility for responding to it.

The proposed framework follows a straightforward chain:

Information → responsibility → response trigger → intervention → public reporting.

The Solidarity Directory's role is neither to replace government nor to become another layer of humanitarian administration.

Its comparative strength lies in civic action.

It can help communities monitor, verify, connect, communicate and demand accountability.

The objective is to restore a basic public-policy capacity: enabling the state to see how society is changing, identify who is responsible, mobilise resources, act before pressures harden into grievances and report publicly on the results.

SECTION / 02

Analytical approach, scope and evidence

This policy paper draws on field research and administrative, humanitarian, economic and social data.

It does not claim that displacement inevitably causes social or sectarian conflict.

Instead, it examines the conditions under which economic and institutional pressures caused or intensified by displacement can develop into social and political tensions.

It distinguishes between two questions.

Analytical question: Under what conditions can protracted displacement and population redistribution produce social and political fragmentation?

Policy question: What institutional arrangements can interrupt this process before social and economic pressure turns into division?

The distinction is consequential. The first question examines what happens and the mechanisms at work. The second concerns what the state and civil society should do.

The primary unit of analysis is the affected locality.

This allows displacement to be understood in relation to changes in population, housing, livelihoods, infrastructure, public institutions and political actors, rather than as a characteristic of displaced individuals alone.

The study focuses on Lebanon in the context of displacement caused and prolonged by the 2026 war.

Syrian refugees feature in the analysis insofar as their presence is part of the distributional economy of affected areas, particularly low-income labour and housing markets. They are not the paper's primary focus.

The evidence combines IOM data, UNHCR assessments, OCHA reports, ILO research, UNDP tension monitoring, government policies and the Solidarity Directory's field research.

The Solidarity Directory's research in southern Lebanon is a central source. It draws on 13 key-informant interviews: ten in the South, two in Beirut's southern suburbs and one in Baalbek. The research documents damage to productive assets, agriculture, infrastructure, supply chains and local economies.

THE FIELD RESEARCH

13 **key-informant interviews**

Key-informant interviews documented in the study



10 Southern Lebanon **2** Beirut's southern suburbs **1** Baalbek

Interview locations, not the distribution of displaced people. The findings concern damage documented by interviewees.

The paper uses four related but distinct concepts.

Social pressure: Observable strain on housing, employment, infrastructure, services and local resources.

Social tension: Documented disputes, hostility, exclusionary practices or friction between groups.

Sectarianisation: The process through which material and institutional grievances are interpreted or mobilised in terms of collective or sectarian identity.

Social fragmentation: The weakening of relationships across communities and of shared institutions meant to manage negotiations over resources and the public interest.

Pressure does not inevitably lead to fragmentation. Preventing that progression is precisely the task of public policy.

FOUR DISTINCT CONCEPTS

01 Social pressure

Measurable strain on housing, jobs, services and resources.

02 Social tension

Disputes, friction or exclusionary practices between groups.

03 Sectarianisation

Recasting material and institutional grievances as identity-based claims.

04 Social fragmentation

Erosion of relationships and shared institutions.

Social pressure does not inevitably become fragmentation.

SECTION / 03

1. When social geography changes faster than institutions



The war struck a country with limited social and economic resilience.

It followed years of financial collapse, weakened state institutions, declining purchasing power and growing household dependence on remittances and informal networks to provide functions that public institutions should help deliver.

The present crisis therefore predates the war.

War accelerated existing weaknesses and introduced a new spatial transformation.

Large numbers of people left their former homes. Sources of income were disrupted. Service networks in some places became distant from their former users, while demand shifted to new municipalities and neighbourhoods.

This matters because institutions operate in specific places.

Schools, hospitals, municipalities, transport networks, water and electricity systems, and labour markets all serve populations distributed across particular areas.

When people move but institutional capacity, resources and authority do not move with them, households and municipalities bear the cost of adjustment.

This is not a problem confined to one sector.

An AUB Issam Fares Institute paper on education provides a clear example. Displacement can do more than damage a school building. It can disrupt the relationships among schools, teachers, pupils, housing and transport on which the previous system depended. When social geography changes, keeping the same administrative structure does not necessarily preserve the institution's ability to function.

The lesson extends beyond education.

Reconstruction cannot simply mean restoring the institutional map that existed before displacement.

Displacement changes where people live, travel, study and work, as well as demand for water, power, healthcare and municipal services.

The central gap, then, is not simply between available resources and needs. It is between a new social geography and institutions still largely organised around an older one.

Indicators of social tension support this assessment. Difficulty finding housing, the use of schools as shelters and concerns among host communities all suggest that displacement is increasingly affecting housing markets and local services.

The question can no longer be only, 'Where can displaced people be sheltered?' It must also be, 'How has displacement changed the population, economy, service demand and institutional capacity of each affected area?'

SECTION / 04

2. Public services absorb two shocks at once



Receiving areas face additional demand precisely when infrastructure and public systems have themselves been damaged.

War damage to water and electricity networks affected large populations in the South and Nabatieh. Healthcare, education and emergency-response capacity came under similar strain.

Schools offer a direct example.

Buildings used as shelters need to return to their educational function, yet some of the families living in them cannot safely return home.

Two legitimate needs collide: shelter and education.

The problem cannot be solved by asking either group to bear the cost alone.

The state must measure both needs, provide alternatives, mobilise resources and explain its decisions.

The Solidarity Directory's research reveals the same problem from an economic and infrastructure perspective.

Interviewees documented destroyed factories, agricultural land, water and electricity facilities, roads and productive assets, alongside the displacement of skilled workers and disruption of local transport and supply chains.

Receiving areas therefore absorb two simultaneous shocks: greater demand and weaker institutional capacity to meet it.

TWO SIMULTANEOUS SHOCKS

01

Rising demand

Displacement shifts populations and service needs

+

02

Reduced capacity

War damage weakens infrastructure and institutions

RESULT: GREATER STRAIN ON RECEIVING AREAS

This has direct consequences for the design of humanitarian and development interventions.

Assisting displaced people without strengthening the communities and institutions that receive them risks creating conflict-insensitive policy.

Residents may experience greater strain on water, transport, schools, housing and assistance, even where displaced people did not cause the original scarcity.

SECTION / 05

3. Lost livelihoods and pressure over resource distribution

War-related displacement is also an economic shock.

The Solidarity Directory's research documents disrupted agriculture, tourism, trade and production chains, destroyed productive assets and displaced workers.

The Ministry of Social Affairs' Economic Inclusion Strategy likewise recognises the scale of the economic shock and identifies economic inclusion as a tool for early recovery and post-war economic stability.

Yet no reliable national count establishes how many people currently displaced have lost their jobs.

This paper therefore does not assign a figure where none exists.

There is, however, strong evidence of how pressures over the distribution of resources arise.


Lebanon entered the war with already strained housing and labour markets. Economically vulnerable Lebanese households and Syrian refugees also work in overlapping parts of the informal, low-income economy.

The arrival of large numbers of Lebanese displaced by war can create a three-way distributional pressure involving:

Lebanese people displaced by war;

economically vulnerable host households; and

Syrian refugees already living in conditions of severe vulnerability.



The issue is how scarcity is managed and how responsibility for resource allocation is assigned, not one group taking from another.

These pressures are especially apparent in lower-skilled work, rents, and subsidised or humanitarian services.

This does not mean that one group is taking resources from another.

That is precisely the narrative that public policy must prevent.

The underlying problem is scarcity combined with weak or opaque institutions responsible for managing competing needs and rights.

Economic strain becomes a political risk when people cannot tell why resources are scarce, how they are allocated or who is responsible for responding.

SECTION / 06

4. From resource scarcity to sectarianisation

The greatest danger in Lebanon is not economic and social competition in itself.

It is the possibility that such competition becomes sectarianised.

UNDP's tension-monitoring system has documented pressures on host communities and housing, anti-displacement rhetoric, and identity-based narratives.

This evidence does not establish that political parties deliberately manufacture every tension. Nor does this paper make that claim.

It does show how material grievances can be recast in the language of identity.

The Solidarity Directory's research adds a political economy dimension.

Several interviewees expressed concern about political actors' influence over reconstruction resources and local economies. They emphasised transparency, community participation and the need to prevent recovery from becoming a vehicle for political favouritism.

Access to resources can also generate political legitimacy.

Those able to broker access to housing, services, jobs, reconstruction or assistance can turn that position into political influence.

When public institutions are absent, opaque or difficult to access, political and sectarian intermediaries have more scope to fill the vacuum.


Institutional design is therefore not politically neutral.

Where access to resources passes through separate territorial or communal networks, scarcity can reproduce the very boundaries along which political competition is organised.

The pathway under study is not: displacement → sectarian conflict.

It is: displacement and war damage → rising material pressure → inadequate or opaque institutional response → grievances and perceived injustice → political brokerage and identity-based framing → risk of sectarianisation.

This also shows where public policy can intervene.



WHERE POLITICAL RISK EMERGES

Scarcity becomes politically exploitable when its causes and allocation are unclear.

01

Scarcity and social pressure

02

Opaque allocation and accountability

03

Political brokerage and identity-based framing

Displacement does not automatically lead to conflict. A transparent institutional response can change the trajectory.

SECTION / 07

5. The Ministry of Social Affairs' emerging framework and the accountability gap

Lebanon has begun developing important elements of a stronger social protection and economic inclusion system.

Those developments should be recognised. Their implementation must also be scrutinised.

The Ministry of Social Affairs' Economic Inclusion Strategy proposes a system covering outreach, registration, statistical profiling, referrals, case management, employment, self-employment, entrepreneurship, enterprise support, access to finance, and monitoring and evaluation.

It also proposes performance-based contracts, complaints mechanisms, coordination with the Ministry of Labour and roles for municipalities, civil society and the private sector.

The proposed monitoring arrangements are particularly relevant. The strategy calls for real-time data on beneficiaries' progress and envisages a monitoring and evaluation unit that could evolve into an economic inclusion observatory.

These are specific commitments. They establish a standard for accountability.

The question is no longer simply whether the government needs an economic inclusion system. Civil society can now ask:

What did the government commit to?

What has it delivered?

Who is responsible?

What has been funded?

Which areas and groups have benefited?

What results have been achieved?

Where do gaps remain?

TWO COMPLEMENTARY POLICY LEVELS

01

Individual beneficiary

Economic inclusion and social protection pathways

02

Affected locality

Pressure on services, housing, resources and municipalities

Connecting the two allows policymakers to assess effects on individuals and on places.

There is, however, a distinction between the unit of analysis used in the ministry's strategy and the one used in this paper.

The economic inclusion system primarily focuses on individual beneficiaries.

This paper adds another question: What happens to the locality in which those beneficiaries live?

A single municipality may simultaneously face rising rents, water shortages, overcrowded schools, waste-management pressure, unemployment and tension between different groups.

A system focused exclusively on individuals cannot capture all these pressures.

Lebanon therefore needs to link its emerging social protection systems to an area-based system for monitoring local pressures.

The aim is not to create a parallel bureaucracy. It is to connect existing instruments within a comprehensive system of government accountability.

SECTION / 08

6. The Solidarity Directory's role: a civic infrastructure for accountability

The Solidarity Directory should not replace government.

Nor should its central role become selecting beneficiaries or managing individual cases.

Its distinctive contribution lies elsewhere.

Through its work in Aley, Chouf and Saida, the Solidarity Directory has invested in local political and civic capacity through leadership, negotiation, community organising, public debate, digital tools and dialogue across regions.

These capacities are directly relevant to accountability under protracted displacement.

An effective state needs administrative data. An accountable state also needs organised citizens who can compare official commitments with conditions on the ground.

The Solidarity Directory's role can be organised around five functions.

Monitoring

Identify emerging social, economic and institutional pressures.

Verification

Compare government commitments, resource allocations and announced interventions against what happens in practice.

Convening

Bring municipalities, communities, civil society and responsible public institutions together around clearly defined problems.

Communication

Make policies, data and institutional responsibilities understandable in public debate and counter misinformation.

Accountability

Track whether responsible institutions have acted and identify gaps left unresolved.

FIVE FUNCTIONS OF CIVIC ACCOUNTABILITY

01	**Monitoring**	Identify local social, economic and institutional pressures.
02	**Verification**	Compare commitments and allocations with conditions on the ground.
03	**Convening**	Connect local concerns with responsible public institutions.
04	**Communication**	Make evidence and responsibilities understandable to the public.
05	**Accountability**	Track commitments and identify who must deliver each response.

This role must remain distinct from government administration.

Civil society organisations may deliver services under public programmes. Independent accountability, however, requires the freedom to criticise those programmes without becoming operationally dependent on them.

The Solidarity Directory's strategic objective should therefore not be to build a parallel state.

It should be to make existing state institutions more understandable, responsive and accountable.

SECTION / 09

Policy recommendations



1. Establish an integrated government system for monitoring social pressure and early warning

Lebanon needs a shared system that shows where social and institutional pressures are accumulating, rather than simply where displaced people are located.

It should build on existing and emerging government databases and systems, not create another isolated repository.

The Ministry of Social Affairs' registers, profiling tools and monitoring mechanisms could provide part of the foundation.

A local layer should then track:

- actual population distribution and displacement;
- housing arrangements;
- rental pressures;
- loss of income and employment;
- school capacity;
- healthcare demand;
- water and electricity;
- waste management and transport;
- damage to infrastructure;
- coverage of assistance;

unresolved local disputes; and

indicators of social tension.

Uncertainty strengthens, rather than weakens, the case for continuous monitoring.

When where people live and the pressures they face change quickly, public policy cannot rely on occasional static snapshots.

Each core indicator must be linked to a responsible institution, a response trigger and a defined intervention mechanism.

The governance chain is: information → responsibility → response trigger → intervention → public reporting.

A TRACEABLE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK

From evidence to a public response

01 Information
What is happening, and where?

02 Responsibility
Which institution has the mandate?

03 Response trigger
What threshold triggers action?

04 Intervention
Which response and resources?

05 Public reporting
What changed, and what remains?

The chain begins with an indicator. It ends only when results are reported publicly.

2. Make the Council of Ministers politically accountable for the overall response

The social consequences of displacement cannot be managed through social policy alone.

The Ministry of Social Affairs has a central role in social protection and economic inclusion.

Yet displacement simultaneously affects education, health, energy, infrastructure, employment, housing and municipalities.

The Council of Ministers must therefore assume political responsibility for a national framework on displacement and social resilience.

Sectoral responsibilities must remain explicit:

> Education: schooling and school capacity;
>
> Public Health: access to healthcare;
>
> Energy and Water: electricity and water;
>
> Labour and Economy: employment opportunities and enterprises;
>
> Interior and Municipalities: local institutional capacity;
>
> Public Works: transport and infrastructure;
>
> Social Affairs: social protection, economic inclusion, referrals and interventions related to social cohesion.

Accountability becomes impossible when every failure is described as merely a coordination problem.

3. Make municipalities the local hubs for coordination and early warning, and fund them accordingly

Municipalities often see the effects of displacement before central institutions do.

They should therefore serve as the primary local level for assessment, coordination and reporting.

> They should track:
>
> population change;
>
> gaps in service capacity;
>
> housing pressures;
>
> disrupted livelihoods;
>
> infrastructure strain;
>
> unresolved disputes; and
>
> risks of social tension.

But municipalities cannot be expected to solve every problem themselves.

Their role is to monitor, coordinate locally and refer problems to the institutions with the authority and resources to address them.

Funding should be proportionate to the pressures they face.

A transparent formula could account for: resident population + displaced population + infrastructure damage + vulnerability + shortfalls in service capacity.

FACTORS FOR MUNICIPAL FUNDING

Funding should respond to local pressures

01	02	03	04	05
Resident population	**Displaced population**	**Infrastructure damage**	**Vulnerability**	**Service capacity shortfalls**

← An allocation formula responsive to local pressures

Illustrative factors proposed in this paper, not a weighted funding formula.

4. Establish local social resilience platforms centred on municipalities

These platforms should bring together:

- municipalities and municipal unions;
- local public institutions;
- civil society organisations;
- representatives of displaced and host communities;
- young people and women;
- economic and professional actors; and
- members of parliament when national intervention is required.

Their mandate is to identify problems early, coordinate local responses and escalate unresolved issues.

They must not become channels for patronage or control over beneficiary selection.

5. Use economic inclusion to support social cohesion

The Ministry of Social Affairs' strategy provides an emerging framework for employment, self-employment, entrepreneurship, skills and access to finance.

The next challenge is to make implementation contribute to social stability in displacement-affected areas.

Economic inclusion should therefore be assessed not only through individual outcomes but also through the geographic distribution of support.

The government should be able to show:

- which areas programmes have reached;
- how much funding has been allocated;
- which groups have benefited;
- what support reached those in the most difficult circumstances;
- employment and enterprise outcomes; and
- how interventions affected local gaps.

Recovery should also strengthen local economic circulation through local jobs, small businesses, cooperatives, local procurement, and training linked to reconstruction and productive assets.

Shared recovery must become more attractive than competition over shrinking resources.

6. Treat public communication as a government responsibility

The government should publish regular information on:

- the number and distribution of displaced people;
- eligibility criteria for assistance;
- municipal funding;
- pressure on services;
- economic inclusion programmes;
- government responses; and
- reconstruction and recovery spending.

Transparency reduces the political space created by uncertainty and opacity.

Civil society and the media can complement this work through verification, conflict-sensitive journalism and responses to disinformation.

7. Turn government commitments into public accountability

Citizens must be able to see whether the state is acting.

A simple public dashboard should show, by area:

- the main pressures;
- the institution responsible;
- resources allocated;
- the response activated;
- implementation status; and
- outstanding issues.

ILLUSTRATIVE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY DASHBOARD

What should citizens be able to see?

Main local pressure	Local indicator
Responsible institution	Mandated authority
Allocated resources	Published funding
Response and progress	Delivered or delayed
Unresolved issues	Action still needed

Proposed information fields only. This is not a published dashboard or evidence of actual results.

Where government strategies set performance indicators or assign institutional responsibilities, these must be publicly trackable.

Accountability should ask: What was promised? Who was responsible? What was delivered? Which resources were used? What changed? What remains unresolved?

8. Mobilise the Solidarity Directory's network for civic accountability

The Solidarity Directory's local networks can provide a civic layer connecting lived experience to institutional responsibility.

Their functions remain monitoring, verification, convening, communication and accountability.

Digital tools and AI can help organise non-sensitive information, compare pressures across areas, track government commitments and improve public communication.

They must not be used to decide eligibility for assistance or to classify communities politically.

The Solidarity Directory is not building a parallel administrative system.

It helps organised citizens turn lived experience into public-policy demands and track whether responsible institutions respond.

SECTION / 10

Conclusion

Lebanon's displacement crisis is not simply a humanitarian problem concerning people temporarily separated from their homes.

It is reshaping the country's social geography.

People have moved. Economic activity has changed. Demand for services has shifted with them. Areas already under strain must absorb additional residents just as their infrastructure and public institutions have lost capacity.

The central problem is the gap between social change and institutional adaptation.

Displacement does not inevitably produce social fragmentation.

Material pressure becomes a political risk when institutions cannot see the new reality, resources fail to follow changes in population and need, responsibilities are unclear, and allocation appears opaque or dependent on political brokerage.

Economic and social grievances can then acquire communal and sectarian explanations.

Resource scarcity becomes a form of political capital.

Lebanon has begun putting elements of a better policy framework in place.

The Ministry of Social Affairs' Economic Inclusion Strategy is one example.

Its commitments on data, economic inclusion, monitoring, local outreach and institutional coordination must be implemented.

They must also be subject to public scrutiny.

A strategy is not, in itself, an outcome.

Nor does the main responsibility rest with any single ministry.

The Council of Ministers must take responsibility for the wider consequences of protracted displacement.

Ministries must answer for the responsibilities assigned to them.

Municipalities must be able to assess pressures and obtain the resources they need.

Parliament must exercise oversight.

Civil society has an independent function.

It should neither replace the state nor become solely its implementing arm.

Its value also lies in retaining the capacity to compare government commitments with social realities and demand answers when the two diverge.

That is where the Solidarity Directory's work extends beyond this project.

The objective is not merely to improve assistance.

It is to rebuild a basic capacity for accountable public governance: understanding society as it changes, assigning responsibilities clearly, directing resources to actual pressures, intervening before grievances become entrenched, and accounting publicly for results.

Without that capacity, households and communities will continue to bear the cost of institutional failure, and political intermediaries will retain opportunities to turn scarcity into dependence and communal competition.

With it, social solidarity can move from an emergency response sustained by goodwill to a principle of accountable public governance.

SOURCES / 11

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ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION

The organisation, the project and the authors

About the Solidarity Directory

The Solidarity Directory (Daleel Tadamon) is a Lebanese civic initiative that works to develop the social and solidarity economy, strengthen local social and economic actors, and build collaborative and collective production models that contribute to fairer, more sustainable development.

Its work connects field practice with research and public policy. It is grounded in communities' capacity to organise their resources and interests, develop collective responses to economic and social challenges, and participate in decisions affecting their lives.

About the project and partnership

This paper was prepared under the project "Strengthening Grassroots Advocacy for Solidarity and Social Cohesion During War", implemented by the Solidarity Directory in cooperation with, and with support from, the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Beirut - Middle East Office.

The research forms part of a broader effort to strengthen local groups' capacity for organising and advocacy, develop practical public-policy proposals responding to war and displacement, address pressures on resources and services, and prevent economic and social crises from becoming sources of tension and division.

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Maher Bou Shackra


Director of Strategy and Policy at the Solidarity Directory. He develops strategic directions and policy and institutional frameworks, with a focus on strengthening local initiatives' capacity to organise and act collectively and connecting community responses with reforms and public policy.

A FINAL WORD

With thanks and solidarity

We express our solidarity with everyone forced to leave their homes and communities because of war, and with all those who have lost safety, stability and their livelihoods. We recognise the efforts of host communities and local initiatives that have responded to displaced people's needs despite scarce resources and difficult conditions.

We hope this paper helps bring the experiences of people affected by displacement into public debate and policymaking. We also hope it supports demands for a fair response that protects human dignity, safeguards social cohesion and places responsibility where it belongs: with public institutions and public policy.



Editorial responsibility

The authors and the Solidarity Directory bear full responsibility for the content of this paper, including its analysis, findings and recommendations. The views expressed do not necessarily represent those of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Beirut - Middle East Office, which supported the project.

Suggested citation: Sayegh, Alaa, and Maher Bou Shackra. Who Is Responsible When Communities Are Displaced? Displacement, Resource Scarcity and Public Accountability in Lebanon. The Solidarity Directory, October 2026.